force, the self-determination of peoples and the inviolability of borders. The Council of Europe requires for membership that countries must meet a minimum set of democratic standards. The Council has self-consciously lowered its standards in admitting Russia, which has systematically trampled human rights in Chechnya, out of the stated belief that democracy would be better advanced after Russia has joined. To fully participate in the European security order, a country must be democratic, a requirement for membership in both the European Union and NATO. The European Union promotes security through economic growth and integration for its members in a common market and throughout Europe through its association agreements. NATO provides the major collective basis for providing security in Western Europe and leads a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia which includes Russia and Ukraine.
The OSCE will consider the common and comprehensive security model for the 21st century at its summit meeting in December 1996. This summit provides yet another opportunity to address pan-European security issues. Little substantial is likely to occur in Lisbon because on a number of major issues, no consensus exists on how to restructure the European security order. What we will see in Lisbon and what we have seen since the end of the Cold War is what Charles Lindblom has called 'ad hoc incrementalism'. Lindblom developed this idea to deal with domestic policy problems for which there are no clear means of identifying a solution, in other words, no grand design is possible, necessary, or desirable. Attempts to implement a grand design without an underlying consensus, such as happened with the collective security system associated with the League of Nations, have failed spectacularly.
The quest for stability Efforts to develop security arrangements in Europe can be seen in light of three factors -the principles that provide the basis for the arrangement, those states that are allowed to participate in the decision and the specific tasks that the new security arrangements are supposed to accomplish. Of particular importance are what Osiander calls 'structural principles', that is, 'those factors which influence the structure of the international system and its subsystems: the number and identity of the international actors, their relative status vis-ti-vis one another, and the distribution of territories and populations between them' .2 Osiander adds a fourth factor, 'the various kinds of institutions or organizations that actors may share between them', but does not discuss it in any detail because he asserts that the existence of these institutions presupposes consensus on basic principles.
The current debate within Europe is over an important part of these principles, in particular over 'who decides' on security arrangements. The bipolar world where the United States and the Soviet Union determined 'who
